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The spread of opinions, memes, diseases, and “alternative facts” in a population depends both on the details of
the spreading process and on the structure of the social and communication networks on which they spread. One
feature that can change spreading dynamics substantially is heterogeneous behavior among different types of in-
dividuals in a social network. In this paper, we explore how antiestablishment nodes (e.g., hipsters) influence the
spreading dynamics of two competing products. We consider a model in which spreading follows a deterministic
rule for updating node states (which indicate which product has been adopted) in which an adjustable probability
pHip of the nodes in a network are hipsters, who choose to adopt the product that they believe is the less popular
of the two. The remaining nodes are conformists, who choose which product to adopt by considering which prod-
ucts their immediate neighbors have adopted. We simulate our model on both synthetic and real networks, and
we show that the hipsters have a major effect on the final fraction of people who adopt each product: even when
only one of the two products exists at the beginning of the simulations, a small fraction of hipsters in a network
can still cause the other product to eventually become the more popular one. To account for this behavior, we
construct an approximation for the steady-state adoption fractions of the products on k-regular trees in the limit
of few hipsters. Additionally, our simulations demonstrate that a time delay τ in the knowledge of the product
distribution in a population, as compared to immediate knowledge of product adoption among nearest neighbors,
can have a large effect on the final distribution of product adoptions. Using a local-tree approximation, we derive
an analytical estimate of the spreading of products and obtain good agreement if a sufficiently small fraction of
the population consists of hipsters. In all networks, we find that either of the two products can become the more
popular one at steady state, depending on the fraction of hipsters in the network and on the amount of delay in
the knowledge of the product distribution. Our simple model and analysis may help shed light on the road to
success for antiestablishment choices in elections, as such success—and qualitative differences in final outcomes
between competing products, political candidates, and so on—can arise rather generically in our model from a
small number of antiestablishment individuals and ordinary processes of social influence on normal individuals.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.99.022313
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of spreading phenomena on networks has re-
ceived considerable attention in many disciplines, including
sociology, economics, physics, biology, computer science,
mathematics, and others [1–18]. In analogy with the spread of
infectious diseases in populations of susceptible individuals,
the spread of social phenomena (such as opinions, actions,
memes, information, misinformation, and alternative facts) is
often viewed as a contagion process that spreads through a
network’s nodes, which are connected to each other via one or
more types of edges. The nodes can represent entities such
as people or institutions [19–21] (or other things); and the
edges can represent physical proximity, communication chan-
*jonas.juul@nbi.ku.dk
†mason@math.ucla.edu
nels, sociological interactions (e.g., different types of relation-
ships), or something else. An important goal of many studies
of the spread of social contagions is the identification of
criteria that determine when the phenomenon that is spreading
reaches a large fraction of a population or subpopulation [1,2].
Scholars have used various approaches for studying conta-
gions on networks. These include game theory [7], statistical
physics [10], agent-based models [22], and systems of cou-
pled differential equations or stochastic processes [2,23–27].
The temporal dynamics and peak size of an outbreak are
influenced both by the specific model of a contagion and by
the structure of the network on which it spreads [12,20,25,27–
34]. A key idea is to examine when a disease or idea—perhaps
one that initially is present in a small fraction of nodes—can
become widespread in a network. When a large fraction of
a population or subpopulation becomes infected (or adopts
an idea), one says that a cascade has occurred. Cascading
phenomena have been studied in a wide variety of systems,
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ranging from financial networks [21] to social media like
Twitter [35]. For example, a failing financial institution can
cause a cascade of failures of numerous other financial insti-
tutions, a tweet can result in a cascade of tweets that promotes
the opinion of the original tweeter (perhaps influenced by the
actions of “bot” or sockpuppet accounts [17]), and widely
spread alternative facts can influence the opinions of a large
population of voters [36]. Notwithstanding these dystopian
examples, cascading behavior can be beneficial, neutral, or
harmful.
Models of cascading behavior on networks can have either
stochastic or deterministic state-update rules, and the update
rules in most models only consider nodes that are adjacent to
a focal node. One example of models that traditionally have
deterministic update rules is threshold models for social con-
tagions. The simplest example is the Watts threshold model
(WTM) [5,6,9], a type of bootstrap percolation [37], in which
each node is assigned a threshold from some distribution.
When considering a node for updating, if the fraction of its
neighbors that are adopters is at least as large as its threshold,
it too becomes an adopter. There are numerous variants and
generalizations of the WTM, including ones with adoption
thresholds that are based on the number (rather than the
fraction) of neighbors who are adopters [12,38], ones with
multiple adoption stages [25], ones with “synergy” from other
nearby adopters [27], and ones with timers in addition to
adoption thresholds [39].
Efforts to develop mathematical models for the spread of
products or innovations date at least as far back as the 1960s.
Rogers [40] gave a qualitative description (as a sigmoidal
shape) of the number of adopters as a function of time.
Bass [41] developed a model for the adoption of innovations
that was inspired by models for biological contagions. Bass’s
model results in sigmoidal-shaped adoption curves, and it has
been generalized in various ways [42–45]. More recent studies
have considered models in which agents of different types can
have significant effects on the final distributions of products or
innovations in a population. For example, Gordon et al. [46]
showed that temporal cycles of adoption can occur if some
nodes are allowed to regret adopting an innovation while other
(“contrarian”) nodes resist adopting innovations. References
[47,48] found rich behavior (including chaotic dynamics) in
a social contagion model that incorporates an aversion to
complete conformity.
Contrarian agents, a key aspect of the present paper, have
been incorporated into various types of models of opinion
dynamics and hierarchy formation. In the 1980s, Galam [49]
illustrated a hierarchical mechanism that allows a minority
community to elect its preferred candidate instead of that of
the majority. Galam and collaborators have also examined
the effects of contrarian [50] and stubborn [51,52] agents
on opinion dynamics (though typically without any network
structure). Nyczka et al. [53] and Nyczka and Sznajd-Weron
[54] studied various opinion models (e.g., q-voter mod-
els) on a complete graph to highlight an important distinc-
tion between two types of nonconformity—anticonformity
and independence—that have distinct implications for social
dynamics. Khalil and Toral [55] incorporated contrarians
into a noisy voter model, and they illustrated that a few
contrarians can substantially alter the dynamics of the model.
Apriasz et al. [56] examined an opinion model that includes
“snobs,” who conform to nodes in their own community but
anticonform to nodes in others, to examine how the density of
connections between two communities can affect phenomena
such as fashion cycles. One can also consider contrarian
individuals in the context of economic markets, such as in
work by Sznajd-Weron and Weron [57], who studied an Ising
model on a rectangular lattice to model advertising in duopoly
markets. More recent work related to contrarian agents, in
addition to [46–48], includes that of Mellor et al. [58], who
examined a population in which nodes can either adopt a
product or become “luddites,” who oppose the spread of
innovation. They found that luddites greatly limit adoption
if the adoption rate is high but not if it is low. Gambaro
and Crokidakis [59] illustrated that contrarian agents can be
a source of disorder in opinion dynamics, and Ferrara and
collaborators have investigated how individual social-media
accounts controlled by bots can exert a considerable influence
on political elections and social cascades [17,60,61].
Anticonformity can manifest in a variety of ways in so-
ciety. For example, it has been reported that partisan bias
can result in some groups of individuals misinterpreting data
and explanations of experts (e.g., with respect to the issue of
climate change), in conflict with the intended message, such
that it fits with the personal beliefs of the group [62,63]. In a
recent example about information spreading, Petersen et al.
[64] provided psychological assessment of motivations to
share hostile political rumors (e.g., in the form of “fake news”)
among citizens of democratic societies, concluding that such
rumors are often shared by individuals because they believe it
can mobilize their audience against a disliked establishment
(rather than because they think that these rumors are true).
In the present paper, we examine the influence of antiestab-
lishment nodes, such as hipsters, on spreading processes in a
social network. Individuals who specifically prefer something
other than the established standard in society have manifested
in several ways over the last decade. They include members
of antiestablishment movements in Western Europe and the
United States of America, who have hugely impacted the
geopolitical landscape, to the curious style of hipsters in
cities throughout the world. In some cases, such as the 2016
“Brexit” vote [65] and the 2016 American presidential elec-
tion [66], antiestablishment opinions appear to have spread to
so many people that they exerted a major influence on political
outcomes. In this paper, we ask the following questions: (1)
How does a large fraction of a population decide to choose
something different from the established standard? (2) How
can a small fraction of individuals spread their antiestab-
lishment opinions to a majority (or at least to a very large
minority) of the rest of a population? (3) Can we capture
these ideas using a simple mathematical model of a spreading
process on a network?
A few years ago, a statistical-physics approach was used
to examine how anticonformists (i.e., hipsters) who make
decisions that differ from that of a majority, perhaps in an
attempt to stand out from the crowd, may all end up “looking
the same” [67] (wearing the same clothes, buying the same
products, having the same opinions, and so on). This study
observed that the dynamics of a population was influenced
greatly by delays in the knowledge of hipsters and by how
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FIG. 1. Illustration of our model of a threshold-based social contagion with hipsters. A node is a hipster with probability pHip, and it is a
conformist with probability 1 − pHip. If at least a fraction φi of the neighbors of node i are active (as indicated by the red coloring) at discrete
time step t − 1, the node activates and adopts a product at time step t (for t  1). We then need to consider which products have been adopted
by node i’s neighbors and the relative popularity of different products in the whole network. If node i is a conformist, it adopts the product
that is more popular among its active neighbors at time t − 1. However, if node i is a hipster, it adopts the product that is less popular among
the active nodes in the network at time step t − τ (where τ ∈ N). For both node types, a tie results in a node choosing one of the two products
(blue versus purple) with equal probability.
large a fraction of the population are hipsters. In the model in
[67], individuals interact with their environments and switch
between two states with a probability that depends on this en-
vironment and on whether an individual is a conformist (pre-
ferring to be aligned with its environment) or a hipster (prefer-
ring to be opposite to its environment). The model has a phase
transition that determines whether or not hipsters ultimately
attain the same state. Touboul [67] referred to the anticon-
formists with delayed knowledge as “hipsters.” Because the
model that we introduce in this study includes anticonformists
with delayed knowledge of the global product distribution,
we adopt this terminology. However, our approach, focus, and
type of model—which builds on threshold models for social
contagions—are rather different from those in [67].
We will explore how anticonformists (i.e., hipsters) affect
the spreading of competing products in a network by gener-
alizing the WTM to a network with two types of nodes—
hipsters and conformists—who respond differently to adop-
tions. Conformists prefer to adopt the product (or meme,
opinion, message, etc.) that is more popular among their active
neighbors at time t − 1. Hipsters, however, prefer to adopt
the product that is the less popular of the two products in the
whole network at some previous time t − τ . Their choice to
adopt a product uses the same adoption condition as that of
the conformists. This is a strong assumption, and we make
it partly for simplicity (as it allows us to build from the
WTM) and partly because it reflects a scenario in which
an anticonformist may more actively rebel on an issue that
is sufficiently established in its neighborhood in a network.
In our model, both conformists and hipsters first choose to
buy some product or form an opinion, and then they choose
which one to adopt. In their study of the effect of luddites,
Mellor et al. [58] assumed that the probability of a node
becoming a luddite is proportional to the rate of change in
the density of adopters of its neighbors. This resembles our
choice that a node’s neighborhood influences whether or not
it elects to adopt a product, but it differs from our choice
that each of our nodes is either inherently a conformist or
inherently a hipster. The delay τ in our model encodes the
fact that knowledge about the total population is not instantly
available; instead, it is collected over some time before it is
available. See Gleeson et al. [68] for a model (without network
structure) that illustrates another type of competition between
local information (in the form of a social-media feed) and
global information (in the form of a bestseller list).
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II,
we introduce our model for the spreading of two competing
products on networks under the influence of hipster nodes. In
Sec. III, we examine our model on a Facebook network. In
Sec. IV, we develop an analytical approximation to describe
the time-dependent fractions of nodes that adopt the products
(where each adopter chooses one of the two competing prod-
ucts) as a function of their degree k and an adoption threshold
φ. In Sec. V, we examine our model on several classes of
empirical networks and investigate the final fractions of nodes
that adopt the products as a function of the time delay τ
and the hipster probability pHip. In Sec. VI, we explain the
observed behavior in the limit of few hipsters, and we obtain
an approximation for the fraction of nodes that adopt the
products as a function of the number of hipsters. We conclude
and discuss our results in Sec. VII.
II. A THRESHOLD MODEL WITH HIPSTERS
Threshold models of social influence are a popular type of
spreading process to study on networks [1,2,6]. To set up a
simple example of a threshold model, consider a network with
N nodes, and suppose that each node i has an independently
assigned threshold φi that we draw from a distribution f (φ).
We also suppose that a node can be in one of two states:
active or inactive. An active node has adopted a product (or
meme, opinion, etc.) that is spreading in a population, and an
inactive node has not adopted the product. (We will use the
term “product” from now on.) Once a node becomes active, it
stays active forever. The threshold of a node determines how
difficult it is to activate that node, so one can construe a node’s
threshold value as its stubbornness level. Node i becomes
active if a peer pressure, which in the WTM is equal to the
fraction of active nodes among i’s neighbors, is greater than
or equal to its threshold φi .
We seek to develop a model for competing products that
spread in a population that includes hipsters. Therefore, in our
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model, each node i has a value Hi ∈ {0, 1}, such that Hi =
0 indicates that node i is a conformist and Hi = 1 indicates
that node i is a hipster. We update nodes synchronously. At
each discrete time t  1, we assume that conformists know
the distribution of products among their immediate neighbors
at the previous time step t ′ = t − 1, whereas hipsters know
the distribution of products in the total population at an earlier
time step tτ = t − τ (where τ ∈ N). The first updating step
occurs at t = 1. If t − τ < 0, we let tτ = 0.
A node chooses to adopt a specific product in two steps.
First, the node must become active, which occurs if suffi-
ciently many of its neighbors are active. If the fraction of
neighbors that are active at time t − 1 is at least as large as
the node’s threshold, it becomes active at time t . If node i
becomes active, it immediately adopts one of two possible
products. If Hi = 0, node i is a conformist and thus adopts
the product that is more popular among its active neighbors
at time step t − 1. However, if Hi = 1, node i is a hipster
and thus adopts the product that is less popular in the total
population at time tτ = t − τ . For both values of Hi , a tie
results in the node choosing one of the two products with
equal probability. Each node can adopt only a single product,
and once it has adopted a product, it never switches to the
other product or becomes inactive. To keep track of the
product distribution, we associate a variable Si with each node
i. If Si = 0, node i is inactive; if Si = 1, node i has adopted
product A; and if Si = 2, node i has adopted product B. We
summarize our model and the decision process in Fig. 1 and its
caption. See [79] for a PYTHON script to simulate our model.
At t = 0, we activate a single node with product A, and we
introduce product B when the first hipster chooses to adopt
a product. In principle, it is possible to generalize our model
to consider arbitrarily many products spreading on a network,
but we consider only the case of two products for simplicity.
Although it may seem somewhat artificial that the con-
formists in our model use only local information to decide
which product to adopt, whereas the hipsters use only global
information, it is both convenient and illustrative (because
the WTM has been studied so meticulously) to generalize
the WTM model by adding one specific feature. This is also
appropriate for exploring the competition between local and
global forms of influence. We examine our hipster model
both on synthetic networks and on empirical social networks.
Our main goal is to examine whether (and when) a small
probability pHip of hipster nodes can lead to a majority of a
network’s nodes adopting a product that is less popular than
another product at the beginning of a spreading process. We
find that the fraction of nodes that adopt the less popular of
our two products depends in an interesting way on the delay
τ in the hipsters’ knowledge of the product distribution in the
total population.
III. SIMULATION OF OUR MODEL
ON A FACEBOOK NETWORK
We start by simulating our model on the NORTHWEST-
ERN25 network from the FACEBOOK100 data set [69]. This
network consists of the friendship relationships on Facebook
at Northwestern University on one day in autumn 2005. The
network has 10 537 nodes, a mean degree of 〈k〉 ≈ 92, and
FIG. 2. Example of the behavior of our hipster threshold model
on a Facebook network for delay values τ = {1, 4} for (a) a hipster
probability of pHip = 0.04 and (b) a hipster probability of pHip =
0.30. In each panel, we show the fraction of nodes in the network
that are adopters of each of the two products as a function of time.
In panel (a), the curves from the two different values of τ are almost
indistinguishable from each other. In panel (b), the adoption fractions
of the two products are clearly different when we use different delays
(τ = 1 and τ = 4). For τ = 1, the final fractions that are adopters
of products A and B are approximately equal. However, for τ = 4,
product B becomes more popular than product A. For both panels,
each data point is a mean over 200 simulations on the same network
(the NORTHWESTERN25 network of the FACEBOOK100 data set [69]),
where we choose seed nodes and hipster nodes uniformly at random
for each of the simulations.
a maximum degree of kmax = 2105. We assign a threshold
of φ = 1/33 to each node. In addition to this threshold, we
independently assign each node a value Hi ∈ {0, 1} with some
hipster probability pHip to be Hi = 1. Therefore, different
simulations of our model with a specified hipster probability
do not in general have the same number of hipster nodes. We
examine our model with two different time delays and two
different values for the probability of hipsters in the network.
We consider τ = {1, 4} and pHip = {0.04, 0.30}, and we con-
duct simulations for the four combinations of these parameter
choices.
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For each parameter pair, we choose a single node uniformly
at random and suppose that it has adopted product A at time
t = 0. This node acts as a seed for the spreading process on
the network. We introduce another product, labeled B, when
the first hipster node is activated. Thus, product B will never
be adopted by any node if the network has no hipsters, and
product A has a head start when product B is adopted for
the first time. We stop our simulations after the dynamics
reaches a steady state, in which no further adoptions occur.
At each time step, we track the fraction of the nodes that
are adopters of each of the two products. We conduct 200
simulations—each with a seed chosen uniformly at random,
with new hipster nodes for each simulation—and, at each time
step t, we average the fraction of nodes that are adopters of
each product over these 200 simulations. We show the results
of these simulations in Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2(a), we plot the fraction of nodes in the adopted
state for each of the products at time t for simulations in
which the hipster probability is 0.04. For these parameters,
the curves are indistinguishable for the two values of the
delay time τ . A much larger fraction of nodes adopts product
A than product B. In Fig. 2(b), we show the corresponding
curves for simulations in which the hipster probability is
0.30. The results for different delay times τ are now clearly
distinguishable. For τ = 1, the fraction of nodes that have
adopted the two products are approximately equal; for τ = 4,
however, the fraction of nodes that have adopted product B is
much larger than the fraction that have adopted product A.
IV. ANALYSIS
We approximate the temporal spreading of products on
a network using a pair approximation (as in [25,27,32,70])
that relies on the hypothesis that the network is locally tree-
like [71,72]. Let ρ (φ,k)λ (t ) denote the density of nodes with
threshold φ and degree k that are in the adopted state, for
a product λ ∈ {A,B}, at time step t . We write the recursion
relation
ρ
(φ,k)
λ (t + 1) = ρ (φ,k)λ (t ) +
[
1 − ρ (φ,k)λ (t )
] k∑
k′=1
F (k, k′, φ)Bkk′
⎛
⎝ ∑
β∈{A,B}
q¯
(φ,k)
β (t )
⎞
⎠
×
⎡
⎣(1−pHip) k
′∑
k′′=1

(
k′′ − k
′
2
)
Bk
′
k′′
(
q¯
(φ,k)
λ (t )∑
β∈{A,B} q¯
(φ,k)
β (t )
)
+pHip
∏
β =λ

⎛
⎝∑
k,φ
ρ
(φ,k)
λ (max{t − τ, 0}) −
∑
k,φ
ρ
(φ,k)
β (max{t − τ, 0})
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦, (1)
where q¯ (φ,k)β (t ) is the probability that a neighbor, chosen uniformly at random, of an inactive node with threshold φ and degree k is
active and has adopted product β ∈ {A,B}; the “response function” F (k, k′, φ) = 1 if k′/k  φ and F (k, k′, φ) = 0 otherwise;
(x) is the step function (it equals 1 for x > 0, it equals 1/2 for x = 0, and it equals 0 otherwise); and
Bkl (p) =
(
k
l
)
pl (1 − p)k−l (2)
is the binomial function for probability p. The product over β = λ in Eq. (1) is in fact a product over a single value (so we did
not need to use the product symbol), but one must take a product over all values of β except for λ in a model with three or more
competing products. In this more general case, it is also necessary to take the sums over β over a larger set of products (and to
replace the step function in the product with a more complicated function).
We write q¯ (φ,k)k (t ) as a function of q (φ
′,k′ )
i (t ), the probability that, for a given inactive node, a neighbor with degree k′ and
threshold φ′ is active at time step t . This probability is given by
q¯
(φ,k)
λ (t ) =
∑
k′,φ′ P ((k, φ), (k′, φ′))qφ
′,k
λ (t )∑
k′,φ′ P ((k, φ), (k′, φ′))
, (3)
where P ((k, φ), (k′, φ′)) is the probability that a node with degree k and threshold φ is adjacent to a node with degree k′ and
threshold φ′. Given an active node, the probability that a particular neighbor with degree k and threshold φ is active is
q
(φ,k)
λ (t + 1) = ρ (φ,k)λ (t ) +
[
1 − ρ (φ,k)λ (t )
] k−1∑
k′=1
F (k, k′, φ)Bkk′
⎛
⎝ ∑
β∈{A,B}
q¯
(φ,k)
β (t )
⎞
⎠
×
⎡
⎣(1−pHip) k
′∑
k′′=1

(
k′′ − k
′
2
)
Bk
′
k′′
(
q¯
(φ,k)
λ (t )∑
β∈{A,B} q¯
(φ,k)
β (t )
)
+pHip
∏
β =λ

⎛
⎝∑
k,φ
ρ
(φ,k)
λ (max{t − τ, 0}) −
∑
k,φ
ρ
(φ,k)
β (max{t − τ, 0})
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ . (4)
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TABLE I. Summary statistics of the discarded realizations of our hipster threshold model on each network family (or individual network,
for NORTHWESTERN25). The second column gives the total number of discarded realizations. In it, we sum the instances from all parameter
values, because the values of τ and pHip do not influence the fraction of nodes that activate in a given realization. We show the mean fraction
of nodes that are active at steady state for discarded realizations and the standard deviation of this mean. For all networks, the mean fraction
of active nodes is much smaller than the threshold fraction of 0.10, below which we discard realizations. For each choice of parameter values
and network, we keep 200 realizations for our samples.
Network Number of discarded realizations Mean Standard deviation of the mean
5-regular configuration model 36 0.0001 0.0000
3-regular configuration model 1843 0.0002 0.0001
Erdo˝s–Rényi [G(N,p)] 52214 0.0072 0.0010
NORTHWESTERN25 35171 0.0001 0.0001
The only difference between Eq. (4) and Eq. (1) stems from
the following: in Eq. (1), we consider any degree-k node;
however, in Eq. (4), we consider a degree-k neighbor of an
inactive node. The latter has a maximum of k − 1 active
neighbors, which is therefore the maximum value of the index
of the first sum in Eq. (4). In these equations, we have assumed
that each neighbor of node i is independent of the others, so
we are assuming that this process is occurring on a locally
treelike network [2,71]. However, the Facebook network that
we used in Sec. III has a large local clustering coefficient [69],
so it is not locally treelike.
V. HIPSTER THRESHOLD MODEL
ON SYNTHETIC NETWORKS
We now test our analytical approximations of Sec. IV
by simulating our model on various synthetic networks with
N = 10 000 nodes. We assign each node i a threshold φi
from some probability distribution f (φ), which we specify
in the following subsections. We also independently assign
each node i a value Hi ∈ {0, 1} to determine if it is a hipster.
As before, pHip denotes the probability of being assigned the
hipster value Hi = 1.
As with our simulations on the Facebook network in
Sec. III, we select a single node uniformly at random to have
adopted product A at time t = 0. This node is the seed of the
spreading process. There is a risk that the chosen seed node
is located in a neighborhood of very few vulnerable nodes. (A
node that can be activated by a single active neighbor is known
as a “vulnerable” node [9].) With such a seed, few nodes are
activated in that realization of the dynamical process, and we
do not observe a cascade of adoptions (in which many nodes
adopt a product).
To focus on situations in which many nodes adopt (either of
the products), we consider only realizations in which at least
some minimal fraction of nodes eventually adopt a product.
We take this minimal threshold to be 0.10. (Another way to
examine situations with a lot of spreading is through “cluster
seeding” [29], in which one considers initial conditions in
which some node and all of its neighbors start out as adopters.)
In Table I, we indicate the number of discarded realizations,
the mean fraction of adopting nodes in these simulations, and
the standard deviation of this number of adopters for several
types of networks. The threshold 0.10 is much larger than
the mean fraction of adopters in discarded realizations, and
it is much smaller than the fraction of adopting nodes in
realizations that we keep. Therefore, this choice of threshold
entails a clear separation between realizations with cascades
of adoption and those without such cascades. In many of our
networks, the number of discarded simulations (in which there
are few adoptions) is very large, consistent with the empirical
study of Goel et al. [73].
A. 5-regular configuration-model networks
We consider configuration-model networks [74] in which
every node has degree 5. As described in [74,75], we match
stubs (i.e., ends of edges) uniformly at random. We suppose
that each node has a threshold of φi = 0.19 with probabil-
ity p0 = 0.8 and a threshold of φi = 0.8 with probability
1 − p0 = 0.2. Therefore, on average, 80% of the nodes are
vulnerable, and 20% of the nodes can adopt only when 4
or more of their nearest neighbors are adopters. We select
these parameter values because this choice entails that some
nodes are vulnerable, whereas other nodes need to have two
or more active neighbors to adopt a product; and it ensures
that a cascade of product adoptions occurs in most of our
simulations.
We examine our hipster threshold model on the networks
for time delays τ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and hipster probabilities
of pHip ∈ [0, 1] (in increments of 0.01). For each parameter
pair (τ, pHip), we simulate our model on 200 different net-
works. We independently draw the specific sets of networks
for different parameter values, so in general they are not the
same networks. For each realization, we stop the simulations
after the distribution of product adoptions reaches a steady
state, and we track the adoption fractions of the two competing
products. From these values, we calculate the mean fraction
of nodes that adopt each product over the 200 realizations and
the corresponding standard deviations of the means. We plot
these values in Fig. 3.
For all hipster delay times τ , the steady-state fraction
ρB,tot (t → ∞) of nodes that are adopters of product B in-
creases rapidly for small pHip. For τ = 1 [see Fig. 3(a)], the
hipsters have access to information without any delays, and
their behavior leads to a balancing of the adoptions of products
A and B. If a sufficiently large fraction of the nodes are
hipsters, the mean final fraction of nodes that are adopters of
one product is almost indistinguishable from the other. This
occurs for pHip  0.09.
In all examined cases, ρB,tot (t → ∞) approximately
equals ρA,tot (t → ∞) (i.e., the steady-state fraction of nodes
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FIG. 3. Distribution of products at steady state for 10 000-node 5-regular configuration-model networks. The different panels give results
of simulations of our hipster threshold model with different delay times τ for the hipster nodes. For each value of τ , we consider hipster
probabilities pHip ∈ [0, 1] in increments of 0.01. For each (pHip, τ ) parameter pair, we simulate the hipster threshold model on 200 different
networks that we construct using a configuration model (in which we connect stubs uniformly at random). The nodes have a threshold of
φ = 0.19 with probability p0 = 0.8 and threshold of φ = 0.8 with probability 1 − p0 = 0.2. For each simulation, we activate a single node,
chosen uniformly at random, with product A at time t = 0. We stop each simulation when product adoptions are no longer occurring. We plot
the mean fraction of nodes that adopt products A and B in the 200 realizations and the corresponding standard deviations of the means. [For
each (τ, pHip) parameter pair, we independently construct 200 networks, and we also independently determine the initial condition for each
network.] For all values of τ , the fraction of nodes that are adopters of product B at steady state increases rapidly with pHip for small pHip,
reaching 0.5 at pHip ≈ 0.09. For τ = 1, which we show in panel (a), hipsters have information about the product distribution in the network
without any delay, and the steady-state fractions of nodes that adopt products A and B are almost indistinguishable for pHip  0.09. For larger
values of τ , which we show in panels (b)–(f), the steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt each product varies for pHip  0.09. The steady-state
fraction of nodes that adopt product B is larger than that for product A for an interval of pHip values whose left end is at about pHip ≈ 0.09.
For τ ∈ {2, 3} [see panels (b) and (c)], we also observe that more nodes adopt product B for large values of pHip. The height of the peak in
the fraction of product-B adopters above pHip ≈ 0.09 increases with τ , reaching a value above 0.80 for τ = 6 [see panel (f)]. We also plot
our analytically estimated product-adoption fractions from Eq. (1). Our analytical approximation matches the behavior well for small values
of pHip and large values of pHip. Between these extremes, however, our approximation has jumps in the steady-state adoption fractions of
products; these discontinuities do not arise in our numerical computations.
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that are adopters of product A) for pHip ≈ 0.09. For τ  2
[see Figs. 3(b)–3(f)] and pHip  0.09, there exists an interval
of pHip values in which ρB,tot (t → ∞) > ρA,tot (t → ∞). This
interval is larger for larger values of τ , and the peak of
ρB,tot (t → ∞) in this interval grows with τ , taking a value
above 0.8 for τ = 6 [see Fig. 3(f)]. In other words, the fraction
of hipsters must be larger than about 0.09 for product B to be
adopted by a larger fraction of the population than product A
at steady state.
For τ = 2 [see Fig. 3(b)], we observe another (and wider)
pHip interval (specifically, at about [0.35,0.69]) in which prod-
uct B beats product A. For pHip  0.69, product A dominates.
Hence, for τ = 2, product B dominates in two pHip intervals,
and product A dominates in three pHip intervals. However,
τ = 3 [see Fig. 3(c)] results in two intervals of dominance for
each product. Product B is the more-popular product at steady
state in hipster-probability intervals starting at pHip ≈ 0.09
and pHip ≈ 0.69. Our simulations with τ  4 result in a single
pHip interval in which product B is more popular than product
A at steady state. From the standard deviations, we see that
different realizations with the same parameter values can yield
rather different results.
Our analytical approximation and numerical computations
match well for small and large pHip. However, our approxima-
tion includes jumps in the fraction of adopters for each of the
products, and we do not observe such discontinuities in our
simulations. The mean fraction of nodes that adopt a product
in the discarded realizations is 0.0001, which is much less than
the threshold of 0.10.
B. 3-regular configuration-model networks
We now examine our hipster threshold model on 3-regular
configuration-model networks. Suppose that a probability
p0 = 0.8 of the nodes have a threshold of φ = 0.3 and that
the remaining probability 1 − p0 = 0.2 of the nodes have
a threshold of φ = 0.65. We perform simulations as in the
5-regular configuration-model networks (see Sec. V A) and
show our results in Fig. 4.
Our results on 3-regular configuration-model networks
differ from those on 5-regular configuration-model networks
in several ways. One interesting result is that the fractions
that adopt products A and B are very similar for τ = 2 [see
Fig. 4(b)] and pHip ∈ [0.06, 0.93]. Additionally, for all exam-
ined τ  3 [see Figs. 4(c)–4(f)], the ρB,tot (t → ∞) curve on
3-regular networks has one more maximum as a function of
the hipster probability than the corresponding curve on the
5-regular configuration-model networks.
On 3-regular configuration-model networks with τ  2,
we observe that ρB,tot (t → ∞) first becomes larger than
ρA,tot (t → ∞) at about pHip ≈ 0.06, which is lower than
the hipster probability that we observed for the analogous
result for 5-regular configuration-model networks. As we
show in Fig. 5, this transition sometimes changes with seed
size, depending on the value of the delay τ . For τ = 2, the
transition occurs at the same probability when we seed more
nodes with product A; however, for the larger delay value
τ = 6, the transition moves towards larger probabilities for
progressively larger sets of seed nodes who adopt product A.
When the seed size is 1, we observe in Fig. 4 that the height
of the first peak is lower when we simulate our model on
3-regular configuration-model networks than was the case for
5-regular configuration-model networks. For large pHip, the
more-popular product at steady state is the same for τ = {3, 4}
[see Figs. 4(c) and 4(d)] as it is for the same delay times on the
5-regular configuration-model networks, while it is opposite
to that on the 5-regular configuration-model networks for
τ = {5, 6} [see Figs. 4(e) and 4(f)]. For many parameter pairs,
the standard deviations of the outcomes are large, indicating
that realizations with identical parameters can yield very
different outcomes.
Our analytical approximation and numerical simulations
match well for pHip  0.05. However, for values of pHip
that are larger than about 0.05, our analytical approximation
again has jumps that we do not observe in computations. Our
analytical approximation also does not match the fraction of
nodes that adopt each product for pHip = 1 as well as it did on
5-regular configuration-model networks. This may be because
3-regular configuration-model networks have a higher edge
density than 5-regular configuration-model networks, so the
former depart rather significantly from satisfying a local-tree
hypothesis (on which our analytical approximation relies).
The mean fraction of nodes that adopt a product in the
discarded realizations is 0.0002, which is much less than the
threshold of 0.10.
C. Erdo˝s–Rényi networks
We now examine our hipster threshold model on Erdo˝s–
Rényi (ER) networks. Specifically, we examine G(N,p)
graphs, in which one specifies the total number N of nodes,
and each pair of nodes is linked independently with probabil-
ity p. We choose the expected mean degree of the networks
to be z = 5 (so the probability of an edge between any two
nodes is p = z/N ) to match the mean degree of the 5-regular
configuration-model networks that we examined in Sec. V A.
We assign the same threshold φi = φ∗ = 0.2 to each node.
With this threshold, all nodes with degree k  5 are vulnera-
ble. We again consider pHip ∈ [0, 1] (in increments of 0.01)
and τ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. For each parameter pair (τ, pHip),
we simulate the dynamics on 200 different networks, stop
the simulations after reaching a steady state, track the final
fractions of nodes that are adopters of each of the products,
and calculate the corresponding mean and standard deviation
of the mean from these data. As in prior simulations, we use
a different set of 200 networks for each parameter value. We
plot our results in Fig. 6.
As with our simulations on 5-regular and 3-regular
configuration-model networks, the absence of time delay
(i.e., τ = 1) in the information possessed by hipsters re-
sults in ρB,tot (t → ∞) being almost indistinguishable from
ρA,tot (t → ∞) [see Fig. 6(a)]. For all examined values of
τ , we observe that ρB,tot (t → ∞) again increases rapidly
for small values of pHip. For pHip ≈ 0.07, we observe that
ρA,tot (t → ∞) and ρB,tot (t → ∞) have similar steady-state
fractions, although one can also observe rather interesting
dynamics. For large values of pHip, the same product becomes
the more-popular one at steady state as with the 3-regular
configuration-model networks for delay times τ = {4, 5, 6}
[see Figs. 6(d)–6(f)], but product A is the more-popular one
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FIG. 4. Distribution of products at steady state for 10 000-node 3-regular configuration-model networks. The different panels give results
of simulations of our hipster threshold model with different delay times τ for the hipster nodes. For each value of τ , we consider hipster
probabilities pHip ∈ [0, 1] in increments of 0.01. For each (pHip, τ ) parameter pair, we simulate the model on 200 different networks that we
construct using a configuration model (in which we connect stubs uniformly at random). The nodes have a threshold of φ = 0.3 with probability
p0 = 0.8 and threshold of φ = 0.65 with probability 1 − p0 = 0.2. For each simulation, we activate a single node, chosen uniformly at random,
with product A at time t = 0. We stop each simulation when product adoptions are no longer occurring. We plot the mean steady-state fraction
of nodes that adopt products A and B in the 200 realizations and the corresponding standard deviations of the means. [For each (τ, pHip)
parameter pair, we independently construct 200 networks, and we also independently determine the initial condition for each network.] For
all values of τ , the steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt product B increases rapidly with pHip for small pHip, reaching 0.5 at pHip ≈ 0.06.
For τ = 1, which we show in panel (a), hipsters have information about the product distribution in the network without any delay, and the
steady-state fractions of nodes that adopt products A and B are almost indistinguishable for pHip  0.06. For τ = 2, which we show in (b),
the fractions of nodes that adopt the two products are similar (though one can see some interesting dynamics) until pHip ≈ 0.93, above which
product B is the more-popular product. For larger values of τ [see panels (c)–(f)], the fraction of nodes that adopt each product varies for
pHip  0.05. The height of the peak, which occurs at pHip ≈ 0.08, of the node fraction that adopts product B increases with τ , reaching a value
of over 0.6 for τ = 6 [see panel (f)]. For all time delays τ  2 [see panels (b)–(f)], the maximum steady-state fraction that adopts product B
does not take place at pHip values near 0.08; instead, it occurs for much larger values of pHip. We also plot our analytically estimated fractions
of product adoption from Eq. (1). Our approximation matches well with our computations for small values of pHip. For pHip  0.06, however,
our approximation does not do well. Our analytical solution includes jumps in the steady-state adoption fractions of the products, but these do
not arise in our numerical simulations.
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FIG. 5. Distribution of products at steady state for 10 000-node
3-regular configuration-model networks with different seed sizes,
where all seed nodes adopt product A. We show the distribution
of products for delays of (a) τ = 2 and (b) τ = 6. With τ = 2, the
adoption fraction is indistinguishable for the different seed sizes. For
τ = 6, our results vary for different seed sizes, but the qualitative
behavior is consistent across all cases: the steady-state fraction of
nodes that adopt product B increases rapidly with pHip, and equal
fractions adopt products A and B at a value of pHip that increases
slowly with seed size. For seed sets with 10 to 25 nodes, equal
fractions of nodes adopt the two products at pHip ≈ 0.07. For a
seed set with 150 nodes, equal fractions adopt the two products at
pHip ≈ 0.13.
for τ = 3 [see Fig. 6(c)]. We generally observe large standard
deviations of the outcomes of realizations with given parame-
ter values. The mean fraction of nodes that adopt a product in
the discarded realizations is 0.0072. This is larger than what
we observed for 3-regular and 5-regular configuration-model
networks, but it is still much smaller than the threshold of
0.10.
Our analytical approximation and numerical simulations
once again match well for small values of pHip (specifically,
for pHip  0.07). For larger values of pHip, our analytical ap-
proximation has jumps in the fraction that adopt each product;
we again do not observe this phenomenon in our simula-
tions. One possibility, which we suggested in our discussion
of 3-regular configuration-model networks in Sec. V B, is
whether our analytical approximation is running into prob-
lems because we are considering networks that are not locally
treelike (although similar approximations are known to be
effective for many networks that are not locally treelike [71]).
Additionally, note that the mean local clustering coefficient
for our ER networks with z = 5 is 0.00058 ± 0.00018, so
our networks have very few 3-cycles. If we ignore which
product is adopted and pretend that the two products are the
same, we recover the usual WTM model; the present paper
uses an analytical approximation that is known to work in
that situation [31]. Our own recent work has demonstrated
that this type of analytical approximation is also effective for
a WTM augmented with “synergistic” social influence from
nodes other than nearest neighbors [27], so the incorporation
of different types of nodes (rather than the lack of a locally
treelike network structure) appears to be the likely cause of
the breakdown of the approximation, especially given that
our approximation becomes worse as we increase the hipster
probability pHip.
D. The NORTHWESTERN25 Facebook network
In Sec. V B, we showed simulations of our hipster thresh-
old model model on the NORTHWESTERN25 network from the
FACEBOOK100 data set for two choices of the (pHip, τ ) pa-
rameter pair. We now examine our model on the NORTHWEST-
ERN25 network more systematically by considering more
initial conditions and a wider variety of parameter values.
Suppose that each node has a threshold of φ∗ = 1/33. In each
of our simulations, we use a single node, chosen uniformly at
random, as a seed at t = 0 and consider τ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
and pHip ∈ [0, 1.0] (in increments of 0.01).
In Fig. 7, we show the mean fraction of nodes that are
adopters of products A and B at steady state. For each choice
of parameters, we choose a set of 200 initial conditions, and
we calculate means over these simulations. The most striking
difference between these plots compared to those for our
model on synthetic networks in previous sections is that now
it takes more hipsters to obtain equal steady-state fractions
of adopters of the two products. In the NORTHWESTERN25
network, the fractions that adopt the two products become
equal when roughly one fifth of the nodes are hipsters. We
also observe that the height of the first peak of ρB,tot (t → ∞)
increases with τ , as was also the case in the synthetic networks
that we examined, and the standard deviations are once again
large for most parameter pairs. The mean fraction of nodes
that adopt a product in the discarded realizations is 0.0001,
which again is much less than the threshold of 0.10.
VI. MAJOR IMPACT OF A FEW INDIVIDUALS:
APPROXIMATION ON k-REGULAR TREES
In Sec. V, we observed that even just a few hipster nodes
can cause product B to become the more-popular product
at steady state, but we have not yet explored how this phe-
nomenon can occur. In this section, we argue why even just
a few antiestablishment nodes can have a major impact on
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FIG. 6. Distribution of products at steady state for 10 000-node Erdo˝s–Rényi networks with an expected mean degree of z = 5. The
different panels give results of simulations of our hipster threshold model with different delay times τ for the hipster nodes. For each value
of τ , we consider hipster probabilities pHip ∈ [0, 1] in increments of 0.01. For each (τ, pHip) parameter pair, we simulate the model on 200
different networks and initial conditions. Each node has a threshold of φ = 0.2. For each simulation, we activate a single node, chosen
uniformly at random, with product A at time t = 0. We stop each simulation when product adoptions are no longer occurring. We plot the
mean steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt products A and B in the 200 realizations and the corresponding standard deviations of the
means. [For each (τ, pHip) parameter pair, we independently construct 200 networks, and we also independently determine the initial condition
for each network.] For all values of τ , the fraction of nodes that adopt product B increases rapidly with pHip for small pHip, reaching 0.5
at pHip ≈ 0.07. For τ = 1, which we show in panel (a), hipsters have information about the product distribution in the network without any
delay, and the steady-state fractions of nodes that adopt products A and B are almost indistinguishable for pHip  0.07. For larger values of
τ [see panels (b)–(f)], the steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt each product varies for pHip  0.07. For all τ  3 [see panels (c)–(f)] the
fraction of nodes that adopt product B is largest for a small interval of pHip around pHip ≈ 0.10. For τ  4 [see panels (d)–(f)], we observe an
additional, large-pHip interval in which a majority of the nodes adopt product B. We also plot our analytically estimated fractions of product
adoption from Eq. (1). Our analytical curves and numerical simulations match well for small values of pHip. For larger hipster probabilities,
however, our analytical approximation is not accurate. For τ = 5 [see panel (e)], it predicts incorrectly that product A is the more-popular
product at steady state for large values of pHip. Our analytical results also include jumps in the steady-state adoption fractions of products that
are not present in our numerical simulations.
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FIG. 7. Distribution of products at steady state for the NORTHWESTERN25 network from the FACEBOOK100 data set. The different panels
give results of simulations of our hipster threshold model with different delay times τ for the hipster nodes. For each value of τ , we consider
hipster probabilities pHip ∈ [0, 1] in increments of 0.01. For each (τ, pHip) parameter pair, we simulate the hipster threshold model on the
NORTHWESTERN25 network with 200 choices for the seed node, chosen uniformly at random, which adopts product A at t = 0. We use a
different set of 200 nodes for different parameter values. Each node has a threshold of φ = 1/33. We plot the mean fractions of nodes that are
adopters of products A and B at steady state in the 200 realizations and the corresponding standard deviations of the means. For all values of
τ , the steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt product B increases rapidly with pHip for small pHip, reaching 0.5 at pHip ≈ 0.2 for τ  3 [see
panels (c)–(f)] and for larger values of pHip for τ  2 [see panels (a) and (b)]. For τ = 1, which we show in panel (a), hipsters have information
about the product distribution in the network without any delay, and the steady-state fractions of nodes that adopt products A and B are very
similar for pHip  0.3. For larger values of τ [see panels (b)–(f)], the fraction of nodes that adopt each product varies nonmonotonically for
pHip  0.2. For τ  3 [see panels (c)–(f)], the fraction of nodes that adopt product B is largest for a small interval of pHip around pHip ≈ 0.3.
This is the single peak in the adoption of product B in the mean over these simulations. For τ = 2 [see panel (b)], product B is the more-popular
product for large values of pHip. For τ  2 [see panels (b)–(f)], product B is the more-popular product for a pHip interval starting at pHip ≈ 0.20.
The length of this interval increases with τ , and both the hipster probability that produces the peak fraction in this interval and (especially) the
value of the peak fraction increase with τ . For τ = 6 [see panel (f)], the maximum fraction of nodes that adopt product B is about 0.90.
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FIG. 8. (a) A line graph in which the leftmost node is the only
seed. (It adopts product A.) If all nodes are vulnerable and exactly
one node is a hipster, all nodes to the hipster’s right eventually adopt
product B. (b) A 3-regular tree in which the central node is the only
seed. (It adopts product A.) If the tree has a single hipster, all nodes
that are descendants of the hipster eventually adopt product B.
steady-state adoptions in our model. From studying this mech-
anism, we expect that some similar qualitative phenomena
occur in many other models, including ones with stochastic
update rules.
To understand why even a few hipster nodes can dramat-
ically increase the number of product-B adopters at steady
state, we first consider a line of N nodes, which we number
from one end to the other with the labels 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1.
Each node is adjacent to its immediate neighbors, with 2
neighbors each, except for nodes 0 and N − 1 (which each
have degree 1). For the sake of the argument, we assume
that all nodes are vulnerable and that there is no delay in
information (so that τ = 1). We also suppose that node 0 is
the only seed, so it has adopted product A at time t = 0 [see
Fig. 8(a)]. If there are no hipsters in the line, all nodes in
this scenario eventually adopt product A. If, by contrast, a
single node i is a hipster, then all nodes j  i eventually adopt
product B. Therefore, if each node has the same independent
probability of being a hipster, the expected steady-state frac-
tion of product-B adopters approaches 1/2 as N → ∞. In
this case, the presence of a single hipster node increases the
expected steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt product B
from 0 nodes to half of the nodes. The main idea is that early
adopters can influence later adopters in a way that depends on
the adoption paths that are available [39]. Moreover, although
the expected steady-state fraction of product-B adopters is
1/2, a single simulation of the model is equally likely to result
in any number of product-B adopters, because each node is
equally likely to be the hipster. This may be a reason why
we observe large standard deviations in different realizations
of our model on the various types of networks. For more
complicated network topologies, although it is no longer true
in general that different steady-state fractions of product-
B adopters are equally probable, the steady-state adoption
fraction in a given simulation depends significantly on where
hipsters are located in a network.
With this simple example in mind, we now turn to a more
difficult example: a k-regular tree of vulnerable nodes in
which the central node (which we label as node 0) is the only
seed [see Fig. 8(b)]. As usual, the seed has adopted product
A. As in the above example on a line graph, if a certain node
is a hipster, it will force the nodes that follow it in an adoption
path to adopt product B, rather than product A. We can divide
the tree into hierarchical “levels.” The central node is 0, and
it is adjacent to k nodes in level 1. Each node in level 1 is
adjacent to k − 1 nodes in level 2, each node in level 2 is
adjacent to k − 1 nodes in level 3, and so on. Hence, level
l  1 includes nl = k(k − 1)l−1 nodes, and all nodes except
those in the last level (which have degree 1) have degree k.
Such a k-regular tree with L levels has N = 1 +∑Ll=1 k(k −
1)l−1 nodes. In the limit of infinitely many levels, a k-regular
tree is a Bethe lattice.
Suppose that there is a single hipster in the network. By
construction, we can view any hipster as the root in a rooted
tree. We can then make the following approximation. If all
nodes have an equal, independent probability of being a
hipster, the probability for there to be a hipster in level l is
equal to the fraction of nodes (nl/N) that are in that level. If
a hipster is present in level l, all nodes in an adoption path
after that hipster (i.e., all of its descendants) eventually adopt
product B. Because level l has nl nodes, a single hipster in
level nl causes 1/nl of the nodes in later levels (l′  l + 1) to
adopt product B. Therefore, one can approximate the expected
steady-state fraction of product-B adopters as
ρ¯B (nHip = 1) ≈
L∑
s=1
ns
N
1
ns
[
1
N
L∑
l=s
k(k − 1)l−1
]
= 1
N2
L∑
s=1
L∑
l=s
k(k − 1)l−1 . (5)
For a spreading process on a network, one can construct a
dissemination tree, which describes how a contagion spreads
through the network [39]. For a k-regular tree with only
vulnerable nodes, the dissemination tree is the same k-regular
tree, except that all edges are directed from the center towards
the periphery. The above analysis indicates that the fraction
of nodes that a single hipster can cause to adopt product
B is related to the properties of a dissemination tree. For
dissemination trees with a progressively larger number of
mean descendants per node, we expect a progressively larger
fraction of nodes in an associated network to adopt product B
when a single hipster is present in the network. Equation (5)
illustrates that, for a given network, increasing the number of
hierarchical levels in a dissemination tree tends to result in a
larger number of product-B adopters from a single hipster.
To obtain a naive estimate of the fraction of product-B
adopters as a function of nHip when nHip  N , we multiply
Eq. (5) by nHip/N , thereby assuming that adding a second
hipster to the network leads to as many product-B adopters as
the number that resulted from the original hipster [76]. How-
ever, the second hipster may be a descendant of the existing
hipster, such that it does not lead to any additional product-B
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adoptions. To account for this, we develop a recursive formula
that takes this possibility into account.
Imagine adding hipsters to a network one at a time (allow-
ing the possibility of choosing the same node multiple times
when attempting to add hipsters). We seek to approximate
the expected fraction of product-B adopters at steady state
in a network with nHip hipsters as a function of the expected
fraction of product-B adopters at steady state in a network
with nHip − 1 hipsters. Let Pdesc denote the probability that
the additional hipster is a descendant of another hipster in the
network. Adding a hipster has two possible outcomes: (1) the
hipster is a descendant of another hipster, such that it does not
yield additional product-B adopters; or (2) the hipster is not a
descendant of another hipster, so on average it yields another
ρ¯B (nHip = 1) fraction of product-B adopters at steady state.
We summarize this reasoning in the formula
ρ¯B (nHip) ≈ ρ¯B (nHip − 1)Pdesc
+ [ρ¯B (nHip − 1) + ρ¯B (nHip = 1)](1 − Pdesc) .
(6)
In a k-regular tree with sufficiently few hipsters, all descen-
dants of a hipster are product-B adopters at steady state, so
the probability that the nth hipster descends from one of the
previous n − 1 hipsters equals the expected fraction of nodes
that are product-B adopters at steady state in a network with
nHip = n − 1 hipsters. We thus insert Pdesc = ρ¯B (nHip − 1)
into Eq. (6) to obtain
ρ¯B (nHip) ≈ ρ¯B (nHip−1) +
[
1−ρ¯B (nHip − 1)
]
ρ¯B (nHip = 1) .
(7)
In Fig. 9, we compare the analytical expression in Eq. (7) to
computations using 3-regular and 5-regular trees. Our analyt-
ical approximation is a good match for our simulations when
nHip/N is small. For larger nHip/N , Eq. (7) overestimates the
steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt product B. Hipsters
need not always adopt product B; with more hipsters, it
becomes increasingly likely that product B is not always the
less-popular product.
Our analysis has several interesting consequences. For ex-
ample, it yields some understanding of how the delay τ affects
the steady-state adoption fractions of each product. To illumi-
nate the impact of τ , it is helpful to consider the following sit-
uation. Suppose that, because of hipsters, product B becomes
more popular than product A at some point during a simula-
tion of our model. A delay of τ  2 postpones this time, at
which hipsters start adopting product A rather than product
B, so we expect hipsters who adopt product A to have fewer
descendants than if τ = 1. This provides an argument for why
the height of the peak of the fraction of product-B adopters
as a function of pHip increases with the delay, and it sheds
some light on the effects of the delay. If there is no delay
(i.e., τ = 1) and there are many hipsters, then hipsters tend
to balance the popularities of the two products, leading to
roughly equal fractions of the two products at steady state (as
we saw in our simulations on all networks in Sec. V).
FIG. 9. Fraction of nodes in k-regular trees with L levels that are
adopters of product B at steady state. We show results for 3-regular
trees with 9 levels (and hence with N = 1534 nodes in total) and
for 5-regular trees with 5 levels (and hence with N = 1706 nodes
in total). We plot the recursive approximation from Eq. (7) and
show our simulation results, averaged over 100 realizations, for the
steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt product B as a function of
the fraction nHip/N (with nHip ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 150}) of hipsters in the
network. As expected, our approximation is good for nHip  N .
Our analysis also improves our understanding of how
various changes to our hipster model can affect steady-state
results. For example, suppose that we use a stochastic updat-
ing rule instead of a deterministic one. Although the above
analysis does not rely on the deterministic nature of our
updating rule, it does indicate that adoption order is important,
and anything that changes the adoption order (such as using a
stochastic update rule or updating node states asynchronously
instead of synchronously) may change the outcome of simu-
lations [77]. However, from our analysis, we do expect some
features of our results to be robust even with different update
rules and update orders. For example, for either stochastic
update rules or asynchronous updating, we expect an increase
in the number of steady-state product-B adopters with increas-
ing pHip for small values of pHip, followed by a decrease (or
stall) in the number of steady-state product-B adopters when
enough hipsters are present in a network (as some of them will
now adopt product A). However, the rate at which the steady-
state fraction of product-B adopters increases with pHip for
small pHip is likely to be influenced by stochastic update rules
and asynchronous updating. For instance, suppose that we use
the same rules for product selection but that we employ an
asynchronous updating process in which, during each time
step, we select a node uniformly at random to update; we
repeat this selection process some number of times during
the same time step; and we then advance time by one step.
We then continue with this process in our simulations until
no further spreading occurs. In this case, every node in a
network can potentially adopt a product even in the first time
step, and the process tends to spread at a different rate—it
can be either faster or slower—than in synchronous updating.
Because the hipsters are distributed uniformly at random
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and the rules governing product choice are the same as in
our original model, changing the number of adopters during
each time step can directly affect hipsters, as their product
choice is time-dependent. (Other nodes are affected indirectly,
as they can experience a different product distribution in
their neighborhoods.) Consequently, a faster initial spreading
would increase early product-B adoption for a delay τ  2,
as all hipsters are guaranteed to choose product B for time
steps t  τ . To test this, we simulate the spreading of products
on 5-regular configuration-model networks with τ = 2 and a
single product-A adopter as a seed. We use the asynchronous
updating procedure that we just described above. Averaging
our results over 100 realizations [which we determine as in
Fig. 3(b)], we find that the steady-state product-B adoption
fraction increases faster as we increase pHip for small values
of pHip than what was the case for synchronous updating [see
Fig. 3(b)]. As we expected, we also find that the product-B
steady-state adoption fraction decreases as we increase pHip
for larger values of pHip. More generally, different update
mechanisms and update orders can yield different dissemina-
tion trees, which describe how a contagion spreads through a
network [39]. This can, in turn, impact steady-state product
popularities.
Another aspect that tends to alter a dissemination tree is
changes in the threshold distribution of nodes in a network.
For example, with a threshold distribution in which all nodes
are vulnerable, a spreading process can reach a steady state
very quickly, and there are then few hierarchical levels in
the associated dissemination tree. By contrast, a threshold
distribution for which a network starts with fewer vulnerable
nodes may take longer to reach a steady state, and one
thus expects more levels in an associated dissemination tree.
From our analysis, we see that this in turn can increase the
steady-state adoption fraction of product B for small values
of pHip. Performing simulations on 5-regular configuration
model networks with τ = 2 [as in Fig. 3(b)] and 150 seed
nodes with probabilities p0 = 1.00, p0 = 0.90, and p0 =
0.80 supports this intuition. When we examine small values
of pHip, the steady-state fraction of product-B adopters in-
creases slightly more slowly for larger values of p0 as we
increase pHip.
For some network families, we expect networks with dif-
ferent numbers of nodes to have different fractions of product-
B adopters at steady state. To illustrate this point, we again
consider line networks and k-regular trees. For a line network
with a single hipster and a seed node that adopts product A
at one end, the expected steady-state fraction of product-B
adopters is roughly 1/2 for a line with any number of nodes.
However, adding another level to a k-regular tree with a single
seed node that adopts product A affects the expected steady-
state fraction of product-B adopters. For example, a 3-regular
tree with 3 levels (and hence with 10 nodes in total) has
an expected steady-state fraction ρ¯B = 15/100 of product-B
adopters, whereas a 3-regular tree with 4 levels (and hence
with 22 nodes in total) has ρ¯B = 1/10. This difference occurs
because adding another level to the 3-regular tree increases
the fraction of nodes that are leaves. Therefore, the randomly
distributed hipsters have fewer descendants on average in
a dissemination tree, decreasing the expected fraction of
product-B adopters at steady state. In simulations on regular
configuration-model networks with 103 nodes (using several
values of τ for 3-regular networks and τ = 3 for 5-regular
ones) for small values of pHip, we observe the same fast
increase in steady-state product-B adopters as we increase
pHip that we observed previously for these networks with
104 nodes (see, e.g., Fig. 4). However, for large values of
pHip, the steady-state product-B adopter fraction can differ
substantially in simulations on networks with 103 nodes and
104 nodes. More generally, our analysis demonstrates that the
number of nodes in a network can affect steady-state product
distributions. Even taking seed-size scaling into consideration
(see [70]), dissemination trees can still change, potentially
affecting qualitative steady-state results.
Changing the way that nodes choose which product to
adopt can also drastically influence simulation outcomes. For
example, consider a modification of our model in which a
hipster that becomes active at time step t adopts the product
that is less popular among its neighbors at time t − τ . Further-
more, suppose that two competing products are spreading in
a k-regular tree in which the central node is the only seed. As
usual, the seed has adopted product A. When we constructed
our approximation (7) for the steady-state distribution of prod-
ucts in the limit of few hipsters, we assumed that every hipster
adopts product B. In the modified hipster model in our current
discussion, this approximation may be very bad. Hipsters
who descend from other hipsters may adopt product A. We
thus expect the product-B steady-state adoption fraction to
increase more slowly with pHip for small pHip if a hipster
adopts the product that is less popular among its neighbors,
rather than the less-popular product among all active nodes
in a network. Performing simulations of the modified hipster
model on 5-regular configuration-model networks with p0 =
0.80 vulnerable-node probability, τ = 1, and a single seed
node [as in Fig. 3(a)] for pHip  0.14, we find that a smaller
(or equal, for pHip = 0) steady-state fraction of nodes adopts
product B than in our observations for our focal hipster model.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It is important to study what makes information, opinions,
diseases, memes, products, misinformation, alternative facts,
and other things that originate in a small subpopulation spread
to a large fraction of nodes in a network. Such scenarios can
arise in the adoption of products and the spreading of memes,
and they can also occur in antiestablishment behavior, which
can significantly impact the geopolitical landscape.
We developed a threshold model to examine the impact
of anticonformists (so-called “hipsters”) on the spreading of
two competing products (one of which, labeled B, is not
adopted by any node at the beginning of our simulations).
We examined our hipster threshold model on various types
of networks, and we considered different probabilities of the
hipster nodes and different amounts of time delay in the global
information that the hipsters possess. In the absence of a time
delay, we found that hipsters tend to balance the adoption
of the two competing products. For all other delay values
and all examined types of networks, we observed that the
steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt product B (i.e., the
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product that would not be adopted in the absence of hipsters)
grows rapidly with the probability of hipsters. Surprisingly,
for all of our networks, we needed only a small probability
of hipsters to observe many situations in which product B is
comparably popular, or even more popular, than product A
at steady state. In our simulations on a variety of synthetic
networks, we found that it is often sufficient for fewer than
10% of the nodes to be hipsters for product B to become
at least as widespread as product A (the only product that
has any adopters at time t = 0). For the NORTHWESTERN25
Facebook network, roughly 20% of the nodes need be hipsters
for product B to be as widespread as product A at steady state.
Using a line network and k-regular trees, we illustrated
why the fraction of nodes that adopt product B increases
rapidly for small values of pHip. On these networks, we
obtained good agreement between simulations and an
approximation of the steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt
product B in the limit of few hipsters. From our analytical
approximation in the few-hipster regime, we observed that
the steady-state product-B adoption fraction increases with
the distance between the seed node and other nodes. This
gives some insight into why there is a much slower increase in
product-B adopters for the spreading process on the Facebook
network than in the examined synthetic networks, as the
former has a smaller mean geodesic (i.e., shortest) path length
than our synthetic networks. It also suggests that different
realizations with identical parameter values may result in
very different steady-state adoption fractions, given that we
use random processes to choose hipsters and seed nodes. One
consequence of such sensitivity to initial conditions is large
standard deviations in the mean steady-state adoption fraction
of each product, which is what we observed in most cases. The
same mechanistic insight suggests that a larger delay τ results
in more hipsters adopting product B early in a simulation,
and each of these early adopters influences the product choice
of later adopters. We believe that postponing the time at
which hipsters choose product A instead of product B is the
main reason that a progressively larger delay τ results in a
progressively larger peak of the expected product-B adoption
fraction as a function pHip. Finally, the mechanistic insight
from our approximation in the few-hipster limit also helps
illustrate that the properties—such as threshold distributions,
the number of nodes in a network, and update rules—of an
update rule or network that affect dissemination trees (which
describe how a contagion spreads through a network) can
affect observations at steady state, although some qualitative
observations should be robust under such variations.
Our hipster threshold model exhibits a variety of fascinat-
ing dynamics on different types of networks. For example,
when there is a delay in global information (i.e., τ  2) and
the hipster probability pHip is large, we observed nontrivial
characteristics in the number of intervals of hipster probabili-
ties for which a given product is more popular at steady state.
The quality of the match between our pair approximation and
numerical simulations also depends both on network structure
and on the hipster probability. For example, our approxima-
tion was effective for small values of pHip, and it correctly
produced a fast increase in product-B adopters with increasing
values of small pHip; it did reasonably well for large values
of pHip for 5-regular configuration-model networks (except
for abrupt jumps that are not present in the simulations);
it achieved mixed results for 3-regular configuration-model
networks (although it yielded the correct result for the more-
popular product at steady state for pHip ≈ 1 in all but one
instance); and it was ineffective for Erdo˝s–Rényi networks
(where it was incorrect about which product is more popular
at steady state for pHip ≈ 1 in roughly half of the cases).
When there is a delay (i.e., τ  2) in the global adoption
information that is available to hipsters, we also found that
the steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt a product varies
nonmonotonically with the probability of hipsters. For some
delay values, this steady-state fraction peaks for multiple,
disparate values of the probability of hipsters; for other delay
values, however, there is only a single peak. This behavior
also depends on the network type on which spreading occurs.
If there is no delay in the global adoption information that is
available to hipsters (i.e., τ = 1), we found that the steady-
state fraction of nodes that adopt product B first increases
rapidly with pHip and then stabilizes, such that approximately
half of the nodes adopt each product.
In summary, in our hipster model, even when only one
of two products is adopted when spreading begins, small
probabilities of antiestablishment nodes can lead to a com-
petitor product being adopted by a majority in a population.
Our simple model and numerical experiments may help shed
light on the road to success for antiestablishment choices in
elections and competition between products, as such success
(and qualitative differences in final outcomes between com-
peting products, political candidates, and so on) can arise
rather generically from a small number of antiestablishment
individuals and ordinary processes of social influence on
normal individuals. In our model, the hipsters always choose
to adopt the product that is less popular at time step t − τ . If
all hipsters regard product A as the established choice at all
time steps—regardless of the actual distribution of adopted
products—the steady-state adoption fractions of product B
become even larger, and the antiestablishment choice (which
is product B, in our example) becomes even more successful
than what we observed in our simulations. This more extreme
situation may be relevant in elections in which the conception
of who is part of the establishment may not change during
weeks of campaigning and polls that forecast which candidate
will win and take office.
In future work, it would be interesting to study our hipster
model in more detail, including investigating whether the frac-
tion of hipsters is connected to any notion of criticality, and
to extend the model in various ways. Generalizations of our
model may be helpful for studying the impact of antiestablish-
ment hubs, such as alt-right broadcasting services or alt-right
Twitter accounts with many followers. Understanding what
makes a large population of voters vulnerable to the views
of a few antiestablishment nodes may help guard populations
from manipulation and fake information during elections and
other scenarios.
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